The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute the mens rea standard for corporate aiding and abetting is knowledge by Walker, Angela
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights
Volume 10 | Issue 2 Article 4
Winter 2011
The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort
Statute the mens rea standard for corporate aiding
and abetting is knowledge
Angela Walker
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Angela Walker, The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute the mens rea standard for corporate aiding and abetting is
knowledge, 10 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 119 (2011).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol10/iss2/4
Vol. 10:2] Angela Walker 
    119 
The Hidden Flaw in Kiobel  
Under the Alien Tort Statute the mens rea standard 
for corporate aiding and abetting is knowledge 
Angela Walker! 
¶1 The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) grants United States district courts jurisdiction to hear 
human rights cases brought by foreign citizens for conduct committed outside the country.!  
Despite the statute being over 200-years-old, it has only recently been revived as a way of 
holding corporations liable for human rights violations committed overseas. The last three 
decades have seen a significant increase in ATS litigation," under which there are two-dozen 
pending cases against U.S. and foreign corporations for allegedly having aided and abetted 
serious human rights violations overseas.#  In 1980, the Second Circuit established the ATS as a 
tool to remedy violations of international law in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.$  While Filártiga 
permitted a non-U.S. citizen to sue government officials or individuals acting on behalf of the 
government in American courts, it was not until 2002 that the Ninth Circuit, in its Doe I v. 
Unocal Corp. decision, found that a corporation could be liable under the ATS for violating 
international law.%  Other circuits have since established that companies can be held liable for 
aiding and abetting human rights violations under the ATS.&  In the 2004 Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain' decision, the Supreme Court set forth the test to establish actionable torts under the 
                                                
* Angela Walker is a J.D. and LL.M. in International Human Rights Candidate at Northwestern University School of 
Law, 2013. She holds a B.A. in Politics from Whitman College, 2006.  The author wishes to thank Matt Norman and 
Bridget Arimond for their editorial contributions. 
! The Alien Tort Statute reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2010). 
" EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INT’L CRIMES, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CORPORATE 
COMPLICITY AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL REMEDIES 5 (2008) [hereinafter CIVIL REMEDIES]. 
# David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability 
under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L 
L. 334, 339 (2011). Pending cases in which aiding and abetting liability remains at issue include Balintulo v. 
Daimler AG, No. 09-2778-CV (2d Cir. argued Jan. 11, 2010) (pertained to South Africa); Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum, Inc., 564 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2009) (appeal pending) (pertained to Colombia); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d in part, 654 F.3d 11, No. 09-7125, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (pertaining to Indonesia). 
$ Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886–87 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit permitted Joelito Filártiga’s 
family to bring a case against American Peña-Irala for kidnapping and torturing Filártiga to death on behalf of 
Paraguay’s then president. 
% Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947–56 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated & reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2003), and dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
& GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 85 (Samuel Estreicher & Andrew P. Morris eds. 2010) (citing 
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005), In re ‘‘Agent Orange’’ Product Liability 
Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 52 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
' Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
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ATS, but it has yet to confirm that corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS is 
actionable.( 
¶2 This contentious issue concerning whether corporations are proper defendants under the 
ATS has created a circuit split. Within just four days this past July, two federal courts of appeals 
issued decisions finding that corporations are proper defendants under the ATS.)  Judge Judith 
Rogers of the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp. that “neither the 
text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate immunity for torts based on heinous 
conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations.”!*  In Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,!! the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also held that “corporate 
liability is possible” under the ATS (although it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning that the 
alleged conduct did not violate a norm established with specificity under international law).!"  In 
addition to the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, appellate courts in the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have all held or assumed that corporations are proper defendants under the 
ATS.!# 
¶3 There is a countervailing wind, however, in the Second Circuit, which dismissed an ATS 
case against Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary in September 2010 for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the court held that corporations are not 
proper defendants under the statute.14 After the Second Circuit declined to grant an en banc 
rehearing in a five to five decision,!% the Supreme Court granted certiorari last October to 
determine whether corporations are proper defendants under the ATS.  
¶4 This article aims to shed light on a critical flaw in the Second Circuit’s analysis that is 
overshadowed by the discussion of subject matter jurisdiction.  Both the majority and concurring 
opinions misinterpret a key element of corporate accessorial civil liability under the ATS: the 
mens rea standard for aiding and abetting.  While both the majority and Judge Pierre N. Leval, in 
                                                
( GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 68. In Sosa, which involved state-sponsored kidnapping, 
the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility of holding companies responsible under the ATS, without specifically 
allowing or ruling this possibility out. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, n.21. 
) Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 
F.3d 11; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, *4 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
!* Exxon, 654 F.3d at 11. Judge Rogers reinstated claims by Indonesian villagers who allege that Exxon is liable for 
incidents of torture, killing, and arbitrary detention committed by security forces serving an Exxon facility in Aceh.  
Rogers reasoned that the dismantling of IG Farben, a Nazi chemical-producer, should be regarded as precedent. 
Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: Corporate Alien Tort Rouses From Its Deathbed, THE AMLAW DAILY, 
July 18, 2011, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/07/globallawyer718.html. “She also notes that the 
principle of corporate liability is generally accepted under domestic systems of law, and general principles of law 
are a standard source of customary international law, despite being overlooked by Kiobel.” Id. 
!! Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1021. 
!" Although Judge Posner affirmed the dismissal of claims by Liberian rubber tappers that Firestone had encouraged 
child labor on its vast rubber plantation in West Africa, he upheld corporate liability under the ATS. Posner rejected 
the Second Circuit’s premise in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) that corporations 
have never been prosecuted for violating customary international law, and argued that, by invoking customary 
international law, after World War II the allied powers dissolved German corporations that supported the Nazi war 
effort.  Id. at 1017. 
!# Id. (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Herero People's Reparations Corp. 
v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192-1193, 1195, (D.C. Cir. 2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 
F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999); see also 
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc). 
14 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). 
!% See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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his concurring opinion, declare that purpose is the required standard,!& it is Leval who sets forth 
the flawed analysis that has been the lingering confusion in the courts and that is the focus of this 
article. By misinterpreting international customary law, Leval incorrectly concludes that the 
required standard is purpose when in fact both international customary law and domestic tort law 
establish the knowledge standard.   
¶5 While subject matter jurisdiction is currently the issue before the Supreme Court, the mens 
rea standard follows on its heels as the next most pressing ATS issue.  Should the Supreme 
Court find that corporations are indeed proper defendants, federal courts should be aware of the 
Second Circuit’s misinformed analysis concerning the mens rea standard to avoid perpetuating 
incorrect law. 
¶6 In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs brought a class action against The Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria (“SPDC”) and its corporate parents, formerly known as Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading Company (“Shell”). The complaint 
alleges human rights abuses related to the defendants’ oil and development activities in the 
Ogoni region of southern Nigeria in the 1990s.!'  Plaintiffs in this and the related actions in 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,!( along with their decedents, protested SPDC’s oil 
exploration and development activities and allege that these protests were violently suppressed 
by agents of the Nigerian government with the assistance of SPDC and Shell.!) Between 1993 
and 1994, Nigerian military forces allegedly shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked Ogoni 
villages—beating, raping, and arresting residents and destroying or looting property.  Plaintiffs 
allege that SPDC and Shell assisted the military by (1) providing transportation to Nigerian 
forces, (2) allowing their property to be utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) providing 
food for soldiers involved in the attacks, and (4) providing compensation to those soldiers."* 
¶7 The Second Circuit dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that 
corporations may not be sued under the ATS since corporate liability is not a discernable norm of 
customary international law."!  Judge Leval, concurring in the judgment only, argued that the 
majority’s ruling could potentially have the following effect: 
According to the rule my colleagues have created, one who earns profits by 
commercial exploitation of abuse of fundamental human rights can successfully 
shield those profits from victims’ claims for compensation simply by taking the 
precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the corporate form.""   
                                                
!& Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 122, 154 (Leval, J., concurring). 
!' Id. at 123, 189. Since 1958, SPDC has been engaged in oil exploration and production in Nigeria with extensive 
operations in the Ogoni region.  Ogoni residents initiated the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) to 
protest environmental damage caused by SPDC’s operations.  In 1993, the Nigerian military began a campaign of 
violence against MOSOP and the Ogoni, which was allegedly “instigated, planned, facilitated, conspired, and 
cooperated in” by SPDC and Shell.   
!( Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2004). 
!) Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123. 
"* Id. 
"! Id. at 149. 
"" Id. at 149-50.  See also EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INT’L CRIMES, INT’L COMM’N OF 
JURISTS, CORPORATE COMPLICITY AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY: FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 
12 (2008) [hereinafter FACING THE FACTS].  The Commission argues that holding corporations unaccountable under 
the ATS signifies the following: “Protection from liability will be granted to corporations for assisting in acts of 
genocide, sex-slavery, and piracy as long as the perpetrators incorporate themselves as a business.” Id. at 12. 
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¶8 The Second Circuit holding is internally inconsistent and runs counter to other federal 
court decisions and international standards of civil and criminal liability.  According to the 
Seventh Circuit, Kiobel is the “outlier” decision on the question of corporate liability."# 
¶9 Kiobel is also an outlier with regards to its assertion that purpose is the required mens rea 
standard.+"$  One of the most commonly argued defenses to corporate accountability is that the 
corporate officers did not want the atrocities to be committed.  As the ATS currently stands in 
the Second Circuit, this defense is a valid one. According to both domestic and international law, 
however, the appropriate mens rea standard for aiding and abetting is knowledge.  The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), and U.S. courts have all set forth that a corporation will be held liable if it 
knows that its conduct would have a substantial effect on the harmful outcome.  This article thus 
finds that under both domestic and international law, the mens rea requirement for aiding and 
abetting corporate liability is the knowledge standard.  
¶10 Part I sets the stage by briefly explaining the need for corporate accessorial liability under 
the ATS.  Part II gives an overview of the mens rea standard according to the International 
Commission of Jurists (Commission), an expert body on both civil and criminal liability for 
corporations. Both the majority and the concurring opinions in Kiobel address the Commission’s 
analysis in their discussions. While the majority inexplicably dismisses the expertise of the 
Commission, Judge Leval heavily relies on it for his arguments and yet chooses to depart from 
the Commission’s mens rea analysis.  Correctly understanding the Commission’s analysis is a 
critical component in understanding the Second Circuit’s flawed analysis and in properly 
interpreting customary international law to determine ATS liability.   
¶11 Part III deconstructs the Second Circuit’s argument that the mens rea standard for 
corporate accessorial civil liability is purpose.  It addresses specifically the Court’s 
misinterpretation of the ICC’s Rome Statute, which is the root cause for the circuit split 
concerning the mens rea standard. Finally, part IV shows that the standard is in fact the 
knowledge standard according to A) U.S. domestic civil law, as is illustrated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and subsequent case law and B) customary international law. 
¶12 For purposes of this article, it is assumed that corporations may be sued under the ATS 
despite the Kiobel decision. Furthermore, while the various forms of complicity that amount to 
crimes under international law should be kept in mind—including instigating, ordering, planning 
or conspiring to commit a crime and the responsibility of a superior who fails to prevent or 
punish the commission of a crime—the scope of this paper is limited to the aiding and abetting 
standard,"% the most common form of accessorial liability."&  Lastly, while the Supreme Court left 
                                                
"# Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017 (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Herero 
People's Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192, 1193, 1195, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 468 (D.C. Cir. 
2004); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2000); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 
197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
"$ See infra Part IV. 
"% While aiding and abetting remains the primary theory of individual responsibility, the Ninth Circuit has discussed 
other theories of third-party liability under the ATS, such as joint venture, agency theory, and negligence or 
recklessness. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 947 n.20 (9th Cir. 2001). Judge Reinhardt, concurring in the 
opinion, argued that agency theory under federal common law should be used to determine liability. Unocal Corp., 
248 F.3d at 938, 972-74 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). See also Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd., 588 
F. Supp. 2d 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2008): the Eastern District of New York rejected the aiding and abetting theory 
concerning claims that police military unit arrested and tortured a Bangladeshi businessman on behalf of a company, 
but accepted the theories of agency and ratification to establish the link between the company and the government; 
the jury trial resulted in a USD 1.75 million damages award for the plaintiff. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 588 F. 
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open the door as to whether the aiding and abetting standard should be determined by domestic 
or international law,"' this choice of law question will not be addressed since it is not outcome 
determinative for purposes of ascertaining the mens rea standard; this article finds that both sets 
of laws apply the knowledge standard.  
I. THE NEED FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE  
¶13 What is the importance of being able to hold corporations civilly liable for violations of 
international human rights? Under international human rights law, individuals have the right to 
remedies and reparations when their human rights are violated."(  Individuals are also capable of 
committing violations of international law, as are legal persons, such as transnational 
corporations (TNCs).")  As TNCs increase their role in the global economy, they also have 
increasing rights and duties.#*  To deter TNCs from facilitating or participating in egregious 
human rights violations, enforceable standards must be developed.#! 
¶14 While companies currently do not have direct human rights obligations under international 
law, they do under national laws.#" In the U.S., examples of complaints that have been filed 
against companies include: the complaint against Bridgestone Firestone for mistreating its 
workers on a rubber plantation in Liberia, Chiquita for paying Colombian paramilitary groups to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Supp. 2d at 387. Others argue that litigators should explore alternative theories of accomplice liability in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals in order to establish ATS claims against corporations, such as joint criminal 
enterprise, conspiracy, instigation, and procurement all of which are characterized by direct and material corporate 
complicity.  See Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts Of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of Accomplice 
Liability Under The Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 39, 64 (2005). 
"& Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, at 345; GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER, 
supra note 6, at 127. 
"' Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).  Under Sosa, the Supreme Court establishes that 
international customary law defers civil liability to the standards of each country.  A domestic court, however, may 
find that the domestic standard is based on international customary law.  But see Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, at 
345 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724, 732) (“Sosa require[s] that civil claims under the ATS be based upon federal 
common law, which applies a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting.”).  See also Exxon, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 13934 at *133 (holding that domestic law is an appropriate source: “the court concludes, guided by Sosa, 
that under the ATS, domestic law, i.e., federal common law, supplies the source of law on the question of corporate 
liability.”).   
"( CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 6. States are bound to protect human rights and provide access to judicial 
remedies when violations do occur. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination arts. 2, 
6, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
13; International Convention on Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
art. 7, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S 3; American Convention on Human Rights arts. 1, 25,  Nov. 22, 1969, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R.; European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. Comm’n H.R.; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, Dec. 10, 1948; African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights art. 7, adopted 
Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986; and the U.N. Principles on Reparation, Mar. 
21, 2006, GAOR. Id. at 6 n.10. 
") Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg To Rangoon An Examination of Forced Labor Cases 
and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 96 n.15 (2002). 
#* Id.; Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205 U.S. 1 (2010) enforcing the rights aspect while 
the Second Circuit in Kiobel failed to enforce the duties aspect.   
#! Ramasastry, supra note 29, at 96. 
#" GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 61-62, 64 (citing ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS (2006)). Companies are encouraged to respect human rights through soft law, 
however, set forth by international bodies such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
the International Labor Organization, the United Nations, and industry-specific principles, such as the International 
Council on Mining and Minerals. Id. at 61-62. 
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quell labor uprisings on the company’s banana plantations, Wal-Mart for failing to stop suppliers 
from committing labor abuses, and Nestle for buying cocoa from farmers employing child 
labor.##  In France, legal action was taken against French company Rougier S.A. and its foreign 
subsidiary la Sociéte Forestiére et Industrielle de la Doumé for illegally cutting down forests and 
destroying cultivations that were the Cameroon villagers’ main source of livelihood, and against 
DLH France for purchasing timber from Liberian suppliers who illegally cut down local forests 
and then used the proceeds from DLH France to buy weapons to fuel Liberia’s civil war.#$ 
¶15 U.S. complaints that have been successful for plaintiffs include a default judgment of USD 
80 million awarded to three Cuban workers trafficked to work in slave labor conditions for 
Curacao Drydock Company; a USD 20 million settlement by American retail apparel companies, 
including The Gap, for abusive labor conditions in Saipan; and a USD 75 million settlement paid 
by U.S.-based company Pfizer for testing its antibiotic Trovan on Nigerian children without their 
consent during a meningitis epidemic.#% 
¶16 It is thus evident that the law of civil remedies is increasingly being called upon to hold 
companies responsible for human rights violations.#&  Because human rights monitoring bodies, 
tribunals, or courts may not have jurisdiction to hear claims against companies and individuals, 
and often criminal law only allows the prosecution of individuals, civil remedies may be the only 
relief available for victims who seek to hold corporations liable.#'   
¶17 Furthermore, the purposes of civil tort liability differ from the purposes of criminal 
punishment.  Civil tort liability aims to compensate victims for the harms inflicted on them. As 
Judge Leval states in Kiobel, “The only form of punishment readily imposed on a corporation is 
a fine” since a corporation is “incapable of suffering, of remorse, or of pragmatic reassessment of 
its future behavior.  Nor can it be incapacitated by imprisonment.”#(  He goes on to explain the 
importance of holding corporations civilly liable. “When criminal punishment is inflicted on an 
abstract entity that exists only as a legal construct none of th[e following] objectives is 
accomplished”: giving society the satisfaction of retribution, disabling the offender from further 
criminal conduct, changing the criminal’s conduct through infliction of punishment, and 
dissuading others similarly situated from criminal conduct.#)   
¶18 The Kiobel majority questions the purpose of penalizing a corporate actor when nations 
and international tribunals have the ability to prosecute individual employees for crimes. 
                                                
## Id. at 65 (citing Complaint at 1–2, Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 05-8168 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Complaint at 459–
499, Does v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 07-CV-10300 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007); First Amend. Complaint at 
172–177, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV- 7307 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2005); Complaint ¶¶ 35–37, Doe v. 
Nestle S.A., No. 05-CV-5133 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2005)).  
#$ GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 65 (citing Dossier de presse, Les Amis de la Terre, 7 
villageois camerounais attaquent Rougier devant les tribunaux français (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
www.amisdelaterre.org/Dossier-de-presse-7-villageois,191.html; GLOBAL WITNESS, SHERPA ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL TIMBER COMPANY DLH ACCUSED OF FUNDING LIBERIAN WAR (2009), available at 
http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/resources/org.apache.wicket.Application/repo?nid=d37dcbe0-09a3-11df-87d5-
49e413573e51). 
#% GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 65-66 (citing Licea v. Curacao Drydock Company, Inc., 
584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Doe I v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389 (D.N. Mariana 
Is. Nov. 26, 2001); Does I v. The Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2002 WL 1000068 (D.N. Mariana Is. May 10, 2002); 
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Ross Todd, Pfizer Settles Drug Testing Case with Nigerian 
State for $75 Million, AM. LAW, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www. law.com/j sp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id 
!1202432695855&Pfizer_ Settles_Drug_Testing_Case_With_Nigerian_State_for__Million). 
#& CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 5. 
#' Id. at 6. 
#( Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 168 (Leval, J., concurring). 
#) Id. at 167-68. 
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“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced."$*  Anita Ramasastry points out, however, that since decision-making within a modern 
TNC may involve multiple persons whose collective activity leads to human rights violations, it 
may be difficult to apportion individual responsibility.$!  Furthermore, the actions of an 
individual perpetrator or group of perpetrators, when facilitated through a large corporate 
enterprise, may also create greater harm than an individual acting alone.  Lastly, many who hold 
a collective or communitarian view of complicity would argue that the effects of corporate 
wrongdoing should be borne by the corporate entity and hence, ultimately its shareholders.$"  
Judge Leval states, 
…[T]he objectives of civil tort liability cannot be achieved unless liability is 
imposed on the corporation.  Because the corporation, and not its personnel, 
earned the principal profit from the violation of others’ rights, the goal of 
compensation of the victims likely cannot be achieved if they have remedies only 
against the persons who acted on the corporation’s behalf…$# 
¶19 While companies currently are not strictly bound by international legal human rights 
obligations, States are.  Under international law, States have the obligation to ensure the 
enjoyment of human rights by protecting those rights from abuse and providing access to a 
judicial remedy when the abuses do occur.$$  The U.S. provided one judicial remedy by passing 
the ATS. While civil human rights litigation is a phenomenon unique to the U.S., European 
jurisdictions provide for criminal prosecution for corporate international human rights 
violations.$%  France, for instance, does not have an ATS equivalent for universal civil 
jurisdiction, but it has universal (albeit limited) criminal jurisdiction.  Whereas the ATS in the 
U.S. is predominantly used by foreign plaintiffs to bring civil actions in U.S. courts against 
corporations for human rights violations, the French system has the “partie civile” procedure 
where plaintiffs may file civil complaints against corporations for human rights violations in the 
context of criminal trials.$&  
¶20 Regardless of the fact that there exists a divergence in international human rights norms 
regarding civil and criminal causes of action and corresponding remedies,$' governments have 
the legal obligation to take the steps necessary to ensure their laws respond effectively when they 
are called upon to address claims of gross human rights violations.  International customary law 
and the vast majority of U.S. district courts do not exclude corporations from civil liability for 
their human rights violations.  
                                                
$* Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 119 (citing The Nurnberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int'l Military 
Trib. at Nuremberg 1946)).  See also Ramasastry, supra note 29, at 96. 
$! Id. at 97. 
$" Ramasastry, supra note 29. 
$# Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 169 (Leval, J., concurring). 
$$ CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 6. 
$% Caroline Kaeb, Emerging Issues of Human Rights Responsibility in the Extractive and Manufacturing Industries: 
Patterns and Liability Risks, 6 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 327, 352 (2008) (citing SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS 
AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 14-16 (2004)). 
$& GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 67. 
$' See Kaeb, supra note 45, at 352 (“Whereas the ATS is quite vague and open in providing remedies for a ‘violation 
of the law of nations’ (28 U.S.C. § 1350), European statutes prescribe remedies for human rights violations along 
the lines of the international law categories of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.”).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 126
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MENS REA STANDARD FOR CIVIL CORPORATE AIDING AND ABETTING 
LIABILITY ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 
¶21 The three-volume report of the International Commission of Jurists (Commission) is a key 
source in the Kiobel decision. The Commission is a non-governmental organization, comprised 
of approximately sixty lawyers (including senior judges, attorneys and academics),$( “dedicated 
to the primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that advance 
human rights.”$)  The Kiobel majority attacks the Commission on the grounds that it is biased 
because it “promot[es] the understanding and observance of the rule of law and the legal 
protection of human rights throughout the world.”%*  Dismissing this argument as being 
“unconvincing,”%! Leval relies on the Commission in his concurring opinion to support his 
argument that corporations are liable for human rights abuses under the ATS.  He leaves out, 
however, the Commission’s analysis concerning the mens rea requirement, which is precisely 
where he diverges from the Commission’s assertion that the standard is knowledge.   
¶22 The purpose of this section is to offer a brief overview of an authoritative analysis of 
international norms concerning the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability and to 
address an analytical flaw in both the Kiobel majority and concurring opinions. 
¶23 “In every jurisdiction, despite differences in terminology and approach, an actor may be 
held liable under the law of civil remedies if through negligent or intentional conduct it causes 
harm to someone else,” according to the Commission.%"  That harm includes harm to life, liberty, 
dignity, physical and mental integrity, and property.%#  Even though common law countries have 
varying definitions of intent for purposes of civil liability, for those intentional torts designed to 
protect the aforementioned interests, conduct undertaken with knowledge of the likelihood of it 
resulting in harm could give rise to liability.%$   
¶24 Just like individuals, to be legally responsible for gross human rights abuses, a company 
must not only have assisted in causing the abuse, but it must also have the required state of mind. 
Intention, knowledge or foreseeability of risk may be brought into question differently depending 
on whether criminal or civil liability is at issue.  Under the law of civil remedies, a company may 
have legal responsibility where it actively sought to contribute to gross human rights abuses or 
where it simply knew that its conduct was likely to contribute to such abuses.%%  This is the case 
                                                
$( The Commission, Overview, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=342&langage=1&myPage=Overview (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
$) About Us, Overview, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
%* Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 185 (Leval, J., concurring)(citing Maj. Op. 44 n.47).  
%! Id. at 185. 
%" CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 10. See, e.g., relevant laws in civil law jurisdictions: Articles 1382 and 1383, 
French Civil Code; Article 823, German Civil Code; Article 1, Section 1, Chapter 2, Finnish Tort Liability Act; 
Article 2043 Italian Civil Code; Article 1.089, Spanish Civil Code; Article 106, Section 1, Chapter VI, General 
Principles of the Civil Law of the Peoples Republic of China; Article 20, Chapter 2, Philippines Civil Code; Article 
1058 (1) & (2), Section 1, Division 9, Chapter 60, Armenian Civil Code; Article 2314 (read with Article 2284) 
Chilean Civil Code; Article 2341 Colombian Civil Code; Article 927 Brazilian Civil Code.  In common law 
jurisdictions, laws are found in judicial decisions.  See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: 
TORTS 5 (Andre Tunc, 1983). Id. at 10 n.16. 
%# CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 11. 
%$ Id. at 13 (citing UK: Bradford Corporation v. Pickles, 1895 A.C. 587; Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. V. Gardner 
and Another, 1968 2 Q.B. 768; Canada: Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v. Scalera, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 
551). 
%% See Kaeb, supra note 45, at 334.  According to Kaeb, corporate complicity standards under the ATS were first 
defined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. Unocal.  Despite the case being dismissed, many courts 
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even for dolus eventualis, where an actor knows that harm may occur as a result of its conduct, 
and even though it hopes that the harm does not take place, it consents to the harm by carrying 
out the course of conduct anyway.%&  
¶25 Furthermore, a company may be held civilly liable even where it has no knowledge as to 
the risk of harm, but should have known.  A company legally “should have known” when the 
risk was reasonably foreseeable.%' Willful blindness—or the legal equivalent of “don’t ask, don’t 
tell”—is not permitted by the law of civil remedies.%( For example, if a company provides 
security forces with information that enables them to torture trade unionists working in the 
company, as long as the violence was reasonably foreseeable, it need not be clear at the time that 
the security forces would specifically inflict torture.%) As long as a company should have known 
about the associated risks of its conduct, it does not matter if it did not know about the risk, 
purposefully or otherwise.&* Thus, that a company did not wish to contribute to a human rights 
abuse is irrelevant to the question of whether it became complicit in those abuses.&! 
¶26 How can the mens rea of a company, which does not have a brain, be proven?  Tort law 
establishes a company’s state of mind by assessing the state of mind of certain employees.&"  
Legally, the board of directors, managing director, and other superior officers speak and act as 
the company and thus their state of mind will be assessed.&#  When these officers delegate their 
functions to other employees, their state of mind may provide evidence of the company’s state of 
mind.&$  
¶27 In determining whether a company is liable under the law of civil remedies, courts in both 
civil law and common law countries consider whether a reasonable person in the company’s 
shoes, with the information reasonably available at that time, would have known that there was a 
risk that its actions could harm a person.&%  The courts look at both what the company itself knew 
and what a reasonable company in its shoes should have known about the pending harm.&& To 
determine what a reasonable company should have known, courts consider best practices in due 
diligence and risk assessment.&' Then they consider what information such steps would have 
brought to light in order to determine what a company should have known. As societal 
expectations develop and expand, the expectations placed on a reasonable company will too, 
argues the Commission.&( 
¶28 What is considered to be sufficient evidence of knowledge or foreseeability for a company 
to be held liable as an aider or abettor? Scholars and courts have yet to decide on which 
                                                                                                                                                       
refer to the opinion’s corporate complicity requirements.  The Ninth Circuit, relying on standards set forth by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), held that to prove complicity, a plaintiff must show that the corporation “knew or had reason to 
know that its actions assisted the crime.” Id. (citing Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 951). 
%& CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 13. 
%' FACING THE FACTS, supra note 23, at 19. 
%( Id. at 23. 
%) Id. at 21. 
&* Id. at 23. 
&! Id. at 19. 
&" CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 14. 
&# Id. at 15. 
&$ Id.  
&% FACING THE FACTS, supra note 22, at 20. 
&& Id. 
&' Id. 
68 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 16. 
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indicators establish the nexus between the action of the direct perpetrator and the corporation.&)  
The Commission of Jurists has listed the following examples: 
! A company’s own inquiries produce information, or a company should 
have undertaken such inquiries; 
! Information brought to the company’s attention by an outside source, such 
as a government regulatory authority or nongovernmental organization 
(NGO); 
! Publicly available information, including reports by the U.N., media, and 
NGOs; 
! Unusual circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice of a 
suspicious purpose for a particular transaction. For example, a customer 
might order an extraordinary quantity of a product, such as chemicals, 
which would unlikely be used for anything except unlawful activities; 
! Duration of the business relationship with the principal perpetrator; 
! Position of an individual business official in the company: if he or she was 
a member of decision-making boards, for example, or responsible for 
certain employees or contractors.'*  
¶29 Generally, it will be more difficult for a company to demonstrate that it did not know or 
could not have known about a risk the more serious that risk poses for third parties.'! 
¶30 Proximity is also a factor that helps courts determine legal responsibility for complicity.  
The more proximate the company is in time, space, and relationship to the principal perpetrator 
or its victims the more likely it is that courts will find that the company had the requisite 
knowledge or could have foreseen the harm.'" According to the Commission, evidence of 
proximity includes the following factors: geographical proximity; economic and political 
relationships; legal relationships; and intensity, duration and texture of relationships.'# The more 
the company should have foreseen the risks that its conduct could inflict harm, the higher the 
requirements are on the company to avoid or limit the harm.'$ Such requirements may include 
taking steps to avoid harm or even fulfilling a duty to proactively protect the person(s) from 
harm.   
¶31 According to the International Commission of Jurists, to hold a corporation liable as an 
aider or abettor, one must show that the corporation knew or should have known about the harm 
or pending harm.'% 
                                                
69 Kaeb, supra note 45, at 334 (citing Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the International Law of 
Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in NON-STATE ACTORS & HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 198-202) (Philip Alston, 
ed., 2005), available at http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/reinisch/non_state_actors_alston_ar.pdf).  
70 FACING THE FACTS, supra note 22, at 21-23.  
71 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 2, at 18. 
72 FACING THE FACTS, supra note 22, at 24. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 26. 
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III. ADDRESSING THE FLAW IN KIOBEL 
¶32 In both the majority and concurring opinions, the Second Circuit judges find that the mens 
rea requirement for corporate accessorial liability under the ATS is purpose.  Judge Leval, unlike 
the majority, provides reasoning for this assertion.  He writes, “the majority’s argument [that 
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS] is illogical, internally inconsistent, contrary to 
international law, and incompatible with rulings of both the Supreme Court and this circuit.”'&  
As will be discussed below, Leval’s commentary, ironically, also applies to his own assertion 
that the mens rea standard is purpose. 
¶33 No authoritative source document of international law holds the view adopted by the 
majority and Leval that the purpose standard is to be imposed for corporate accessorial civil 
liability.  As the following pages will analyze, domestic tort law as well as the vast majority of 
decisions rendered in U.S. federal courts also assert the knowledge standard. 
A. Overview of the Second Circuit’s mens rea analysis 
¶34 While the Kiobel majority relies on Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in the three-
judge panel split in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.'' to determine that there is no 
corporate liability under the ATS,'( Leval bases his analysis on the same opinion to support his 
purpose standard.') Since the allegations failed to support a reasonable inference that Shell 
provided substantial assistance to the Nigerian government with a purpose to advance or 
facilitate the government’s human rights violations, Leval argues, the plaintiffs failed to state a 
valid claim of aiding and abetting.(* By relying on Katzmann’s erroneous reasoning, Leval 
perpetuates incorrect law. 
¶35 In Khulumani, Katzmann opined that a defendant may be held liable under international 
law for aiding and abetting the violation of that law by another [only if] the defendant (1) 
provides practical assistance to the principal which has substantial effect on the perpetration of 
the crime, and (2) does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.(!  Judge 
Katzmann’s reasoning was adopted as law of the circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy Inc.(" 
¶36 In Kiobel, Leval argued that the Complaint’s allegations were legally insufficient because 
they lacked a “reasonable inference that Shell provided substantial assistance to the Nigerian 
government with a purpose to advance or facilitate the Nigerian government’s violations of the 
Ogoni people.”(# The Complaint asserts (1) that SPDC and Shell met in Europe in February 1993 
and “formulate[d] a strategy to suppress MOSOP($ and to return to Ogoniland,” (2) that “[b]ased 
on past behavior, Shell and SPDC knew that the means to be used [by the Nigerian military] in 
that endeavor would include military violence against Ogoni civilians,” and (3) that “Shell and 
SPDC” provided direct, physical support to the Nigerian military and police operations 
                                                
76 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 174. 
77 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). 
78 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 129 (Maj. Op.) 
79 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 192 (Leval, J., concurring). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan et al. v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009), quoting 
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277) (Katzmann, concurring) (emphasis added by the Second Circuit in Kiobel). 
82 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009). 
83 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 192 (Leval, J., concurring). 
84 The Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). Id. at 123, 189. 
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conducted against the Ogoni by, for example, providing transportation to the Nigerian forces; 
utilizing Shell property as a staging area for attacks; and providing food, clothing, gear, and pay 
for soldiers involved.(%  
¶37 According to Leval, the allegation that Shell “knew” the Nigerian military would use 
military violence against Ogoni civilians does not support an inference that Shell intended for 
such violence to occur.(&  A petroleum company may well provide financing and assistance to 
the local government to obtain protection needed for petroleum exploration and extraction with 
knowledge that the government violates human rights in providing such protection.(' In a 
footnote, Leval responds to the Complaint’s allegation that “SPDC Managing Director Philip B. 
Watts, with the approval of Shell, requested the Nigerian Police Inspector General to increase 
SPDC’s security…to deter and quell community disturbances.”((  According to Leval, such a 
request is not a request for human rights violations, such as torture, crimes against humanity, or 
extrajudicial killing.() He writes, “Knowledge of the government’s repeated pattern of abuses 
and expectation that they will be repeated…is not the same as a purpose to advance or facilitate 
                                                
85 Id. at 192 (Leval, J., concurring). See id. at 189-90 for further facts indicating proximity: “In February 1993, 
following a demand by MOSOP for royalties for the Ogoni people, Shell and SPDC officials met in the Netherlands 
and England in February 1993 to ‘formulate a strategy to suppress MOSOP and to return to Ogoniland.’ In April 
1993, SPDC called for assistance from government troops. The Nigerian government troops fired on Ogoni residents 
protesting a new pipeline, killing eleven. Later, SPDC's divisional manager wrote to the Governor of Rivers State (in 
which Ogoni is located) and requested ‘the usual assistance’ to protect the progress of SPDC's further work on the 
pipeline. In August through October 1993, the Nigerian military attacked Ogoni villages, killing large numbers of 
civilians. SPDC provided a helicopter and boats for reconnaissance, provided transportation to the Nigerian forces 
involved, provided SPDC property as a staging area for the attacks, and provided food and compensation to the 
soldiers involved in the attacks. In an operation in October 1993, SPDC employees accompanied Nigerian military 
personnel in an SPDC charter bus to a village where the military personnel fired on unarmed villagers. 
In December 1993, SPDC's managing director, with the approval of Shell, asked the Nigerian Police Inspector 
General to increase security in exchange for providing Nigerian forces with salary, housing, equipment, and 
vehicles. Shortly thereafter, the Nigerian government created the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (ISTF). 
Shell and SPDC provided financial support for the ISTF's operations, as well as transportation, food, and 
ammunition for its personnel. In April 1994, the Rivers State Military Administrator ordered the ISTF to ‘“sanitize” 
Ogoniland, in order to ensure that those “carrying out ventures . . . within Ogoniland are not molested.”’ The head of 
the ISTF responded in May that ‘Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military operations are undertaken 
for smooth economic activities to commence.’ 
From May to August 1994, the ISTF engaged in numerous nighttime raids on Ogoni towns and villages. 
During these raids, the ISTF ‘broke into homes, shooting or beating anyone in their path, including the elderly, 
women and children, raping, forcing villagers to pay “settlement fees,” bribes and ransoms to secure their release, 
forcing villagers to flee and abandon their homes, and burning, destroying or looting property,’ and killed at least 
fifty Ogoni residents. Plaintiffs and others were arrested and detained without formal charges and without access to 
a civilian court system, some for more than four weeks. In the detention facility, Plaintiffs and others were beaten 
and were provided inadequate medical care, food, and sanitary facilities. SPDC officials ‘frequently visited the . . . 
detention facility’ and ‘regularly provided food and logistical support for the soldiers’ who worked there. 
In 1994, the Nigerian military created a ‘Special Tribunal’ to try leaders of MOSOP, including Dr. Barinem 
Kiobel, a Rivers State politician who objected to the tactics of the ISTF and supported MOSOP. Counsel to those 
brought before the Special Tribunal were ‘subjected to actual or threatened beatings or other physical harm.’ The 
Complaint alleges also that, with Shell's complicity, witnesses were bribed to give false testimony before the Special 
Tribunal. In January 1995, the Nigerian military violently put down a protest against Shell's operations and the 
Special Tribunal, and the protesters who were detained were subjected to ‘floggings, beatings and other torture[,] 
and money was extorted to obtain releases.’ Dr. Kiobel and others were condemned to death by the Special Tribunal 
and executed in November 1995.” 
86 Id. at 192 n.53. 
87 Id. at 193. 
88 Id. at 192. 
89 Id. at 192-93 n.53. 
Vol. 10:2] Angela Walker 
    131 
such abuses.”)*  As such, he argues, knowledge of the abuses does not justify the imposition of 
liability for aiding and abetting those abuses.)!  Thus, Shell’s knowledge of the Nigerian 
government’s intent to violate the law of nations would not be sufficient to support aider and 
abettor liability.)"  
¶38 According to the D.C. Circuit in Exxon, however, the Second Circuit in Talisman 
misapprehended the test for aiding and abetting under customary international law.)#  The D.C. 
Circuit found that not only is aiding and abetting a proper theory of liability under the ATS, but 
it also held that the relevant mens rea requirement is the knowledge standard.)$ 
B. Analysis of the Second Circuit’s erroneous reasoning 
¶39 By relying on a split decision opinion in Khulumani, the Second Circuit in Kiobel furthered 
a misunderstanding of corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.  In particular, 
Leval, largely because he bases his analysis on Judge Katzmann’s opinion, incorrectly analyzes 
the mens rea standard (as did the Second Circuit in Talisman by relying on Katzmann, which 
will be discussed below).  This section deconstructs the erroneous reasoning in Judge 
Katzmann’s opinion, the root cause of much misunderstanding of the ATS mens rea standard. 
¶40 In Khulumani, Judge Katzmann passes over international law sources that specify a 
“knowledge” standard for aiding and abetting in favor of the Rome Statute, which he 
misinterprets as setting forth the “purpose” standard.)%  There are two flaws with this analysis: 1) 
the Rome Statute was never meant to reflect customary international law, and 2) the Second 
Circuit erred in concluding that the Rome Statute requires purpose. 
¶41 Keeping in line with Katzmann’s analysis, Leval also relies primarily on the Rome Statute, 
which is ironic given his criticism of the majority opinion (the majority argues that because 
corporations cannot be held liable under criminal law, neither can they be defendants in 
international civil suits).)&  
The reasons why the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals has been 
limited to the prosecution of natural persons, as opposed to juridical entities, 
relate to the nature and purposes of criminal punishment, and have no application 
to the very different nature and purposes of civil compensatory liability.)' 
                                                
90 Id. at 193. 
91 Id. at 194. 
92 Id. 
93 Exxon, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *69. 
94 Id. at *79.  
95 Brief of David J. Scheffer, Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University 
School of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, The Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7652, at *2 (May 19, 2010) (No. 09-1262) [hereinafter Scheffer, 
Talisman Amicus].   
96 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 170 (Leval, J., concurring) (citing majority opinion at 46). 
97 Id. at 166 (Leval, J., concurring). Note, as will be discussed below, that Leval’s analysis is incorrect.  The 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals in fact have not been limited to the prosecution of natural persons. 
Rather they have held corporations liable for their human rights abuses. 
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Leval points out that the majority cites neither scholarly discussion nor any source document of 
international law, and that in fact, those sources contradict the majority’s assertion that no 
distinction exists between civil and criminal liability.)(   
¶42 Ironically, he then uses international criminal law to determine that the required mens rea 
standard under the ATS—which establishes civil liability—is purpose.  His analysis is flawed in 
two crucial ways.  First, he bypasses sources of international criminal law that set forth the 
knowledge standard for aiding and abetting.  Second, he bypasses those sources in favor of the 
Rome Statute, which was never meant to reflect customary international law and furthermore has 
yet to be ratified by the United States.  Furthermore, as will be discussed below, even if the 
Rome Statute would be an appropriate reference for customary international civil law, a proper 
interpretation would find that in fact, the Statute may readily be interpreted as setting forth the 
knowledge standard.  
1. Interpreting the mens rea requirement under the Rome Statute  
¶43 Katzmann, then the Talisman majority, and most recently Leval, all erred in 
misinterpreting the Rome Statute as setting forth customary law and the purpose standard.  The 
Rome Statute should not be relied upon to determine the mens rea standard for corporate 
accessorial civil liability, as previously stated, for the following reasons: 1) in its entirety it does 
not purport to reflect customary international law, and 2) it has not been interpreted by the ICC 
as requiring purpose for aiding and abetting liability.))  
¶44 According to David J. Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues 
and head of the U.S. delegation involved in negotiating the Rome Statute:!**  
The Second Circuit errs in drawing upon Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court as a demonstration of customary international 
law for aiding and abetting atrocity crimes under the Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction…The Rome Statute was never intended, in its entirety, to reflect 
international law.!*!  
¶45 Last July, the D.C. Circuit found that the Rome Statute “is properly viewed in the nature of 
a treaty and not as customary international law.”!*"  In fact, Article 10 specifically provides that 
the Rome Statute is not to be “interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law.”!*#  Furthermore, the ICC recognized in Prosecutor v. 
                                                
98 Id. at 170. 
99 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 5. 
100 Ambassador Scheffer served as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001), led the U.S. 
delegation that negotiated the Rome Statute and its supplemental documents from 1997 to 2001, and was its deputy 
head from 1995 to 1997.  
101 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 2-3.  See also Brief of David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University 
School of Law Center for International Human Rights, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a Writ of 
Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), at 10 (July 12, 2011) (No. 10-1491) 
[hereinafter Scheffer, Kiobel Amicus]. 
102 Exxon, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *67 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 10, 
opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002); Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom, 
Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 909, 911, 917 n.11 (2000); Otto Triffterer, Article 10, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 317 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
103 Exxon, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *67. 
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Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui that the Rome Statute does not necessarily 
represent customary international law.!*$ Lastly, Judge Rogers, who wrote the D.C. Circuit’s 
Exxon opinion, points out, “[a]s a treaty, the Rome Statute binds only those countries that have 
ratified it…and the United States has not.”!*%  
¶46 While it is universally accepted that corporations are subject to civil liability under 
domestic law,!*& domestic practice varies considerably worldwide on the criminal liability of 
corporations.!*'  The lack of consensus among States concerning corporate liability (which the 
Kiobel majority argues is evidence that corporate liability is not firmly established as a matter of 
international law!*() therefore relates to criminal, not civil liability.!*)  Furthermore, Ambassador 
Scheffer notes that he was not advised by the Justice Department that Article 25(3)(c) on aiding 
and abetting was being settled as a matter of customary international law.!!* Article 25(3)(c) was 
negotiated not to codify customary international law, but to balance the many common law and 
civil law views about how to express the mens rea of the aider or abettor.!!! 
¶47 While the Rome Statute does not purport to lay out customary law with regards to the 
aiding and abetting standard, should it be referenced a proper interpretation would find that the 
statute sets forth the knowledge standard.  The language of Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute 
reads that a person will be criminally liable for punishment for a crime within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction if he “for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or 
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means 
for its commission.”!!"   Currently there is no ICC precedent that interprets Article 25(3)(c) with 
respect to accessorial liability for aiding and abetting.!!# 
¶48 However, offering his insight into the Rome Statute negotiations, Scheffer asserts that the 
aider and abettor’s liability under Article 25(3)(c) must be established with reference to the mens 
rea principles established in Article 30 of the Rome Statute, which expressly lays out the mental 
elements of crimes. Article 30 reads, “a person has intent where: (a) In relation to conduct, that 
person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to 
cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”!!$  Under 
                                                
104 Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 507-08 (Sept. 30, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf. 
105 Exxon, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *68. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
106 Scheffer, Kiobel Amicus, supra note 101, at 5 n.3:  “See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1382-84 (Fr.); 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, § 31 (Ger.); MINP" [MINP"] [Civ. C.] art. 709, 
710, 715 (Japan); see generally, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, REPORT OF THE EXPERT LEGAL PANEL ON 
CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2008), available at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Updates/Archive/ICJPaneloncomplicity; see also Exxon, No. 09-7125, 2011 WL 2652384, at *53 
(“Legal systems throughout the world recognize that corporate legal responsibility is part and parcel of the privilege 
of corporate personhood.”). 
107 Scheffer, Kiobel Amicus, supra note 101, at 5 (emphasis added). 
108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 119 n.16. 
109 Scheffer, Kiobel Amicus, supra note 101, at 4.  
110 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 12. 
111 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 11.  See also Brief of David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University 
School of Law Center for International Human Rights, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants and Reversal, 
Doe 1 v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010), at 11-12 (July 1, 2012) (No. 10-56739).  
112 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(c), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
113 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, at 352.  
114 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 112, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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Article 30(3), “’knowledge means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will 
occur in the ordinary course of events.”!!% 
¶49 Donald Piragoff, lead Canadian government negotiator on general principles of law during 
the Rome Statute negotiations, also shed light on the relationship between aiding and abetting 
liability under Article 25(3)(c) and the mental element requirements of Article 30(2):  
Article 30 para. 2(b) makes it clear that “intent” may be satisfied by an awareness 
that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.  This same type of 
awareness can also satisfy the mental element of “knowledge,” as defined in 
article 30 para. 3.!!& 
¶50 The word “intention” was too controversial in negotiations since it has different meanings 
in different contexts.  In some countries, intention is inferred from an actor’s engaging in 
conduct with knowledge of the likely consequences.!!'  Other countries preferred the term 
“knowledge” since it better reflects their national practice, and it had been applied in the 
jurisprudence of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR).!!(  Thus, negotiators of the Rome Statute compromised by settling on the word 
“purpose,” which allows more flexibility when interpreted in accordance with the prior 
resolution of Article 30.!!)  
¶51 The negotiators had the opportunity, but chose not to inject a shared intention standard into 
aiding abetting under Article 30.!"* The purpose standard for aiding and abetting would obliterate 
the distinction between aiders and abettors and perpetrators of atrocity crimes.  In other words, 
the negotiators could have laid out aiding and abetting as a co-perpetrator mode of liability, but 
they did not.!"!   
¶52 Thus, the Second Circuit judges in Khulumani, Talisman, and now Kiobel, misinterpreted 
the word “purpose” in Article 25(3)(c) to mean a shared intent standard for aiding and abetting.  
While there is no ICC precedent that interprets Article 25(3)(c), when read in conjunction with 
Article 30, it may reasonably be construed as establishing a knowledge standard for aiding and 
                                                
115 Id. 
116 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 20 (citing Donald K. Piragoff & Darryl Robinson, Article 30: 
Mental Element, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 849, 855 
(Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008). See also Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3: 
A question arises as to whether the conjunctive formulation [intent and knowledge] changes existing 
international jurisprudence that an accomplice (such as an aider or abettor) need not share the same mens rea of 
the principal, and that a knowing participation in the commission of an offence or awareness of the act of 
participation coupled with a conscious decision to participate is sufficient mental culpability for an accomplice.  
It is submitted that the conjunctive formulation has not altered this jurisprudence, but merely reflects the fact 
that aiding and abetting by an accused requires both knowledge of the crime being committed by the principal 
and some intentional conduct by the accused that constitutes the participation….Article 30 para. 2(b) makes it 
clear that “intent” may be satisfied by an awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.  This same type of awareness can also satisfy the mental element of “knowledge,” as defined in article 
30, para. 3.   Therefore, if both “intent” and “knowledge” are required on the part of an accomplice, these 
mental elements can be satisfied by such awareness. Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, at 355 (citing Piragoff & 
Robinson, supra note 118, at 855). 
117 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 12. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 16-17. 
121 Id. 
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abetting liability.!"" Regardless, it is up to the judges of the ICC, not the judges of U.S. district 
courts, to determine the proper criteria for accessorial liability under the ICC’s jurisdiction.!"# 
Scheffer argues that when Article 25(3)(c) is interpreted by the judges of the ICC, they are likely 
to find the standard for aiding and abetting as it has developed in the jurisprudence of the 
international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals, in State practice, and in the writings of leaders scholars, all of which assert the 
knowledge standard.!"$  
¶53 Because the Rome Statute 1) is not a reflection of customary international law and 2) has 
not been interpreted by the ICC as requiring purpose for aiding and abetting liability, U.S. courts 
should ascertain the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting under the ATS from customary 
international law and domestic law, which have long applied the knowledge!"% standard. 
¶54 The weight of international precedent has identified the knowledge standard for aiding and 
abetting liability.!"&  Arguably, the purpose test set forth by the Second Circuit in Katzmann’s 
Khulumani opinion and then Talisman was “just as fatal to the corporate alien tort as Kiobel.”!"'  
By relying on the erroneous Rome Statute interpretation in Khulumani and Talisman, the Second 
Circuit in Kiobel once again misinterpreted Article 25(3)(c), which negates neither the large 
body of precedents that set forth the knowledge standard nor the common sense reality of how 
atrocity crimes are committed.!"( 
IV. UNDER U.S. DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW, THE MENS REA STANDARD 
FOR CORPORATE AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY IS KNOWLEDGE 
¶55 Under both domestic and international law on civil liability, corporate defendants can be 
found liable for accessorial liability.!")  As the following sections will show, the applicability of 
the aiding and abetting doctrine to many corporate defendants in ATS litigation is perhaps over 
determined.!#*  In other words, it has been argued that virtually every international law violation 
alleged under the ATS has a counterpart in American tort law.!#!  
Genocide, torture, and rape are all incidents of battery, assault, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and where death results, wrongful death. Slave 
labor is a form of false imprisonment, as is excessive detention. Even in the 
earliest cases in which the Court found international law violations by relying on 
                                                
122 Id. at 5. 
123 See Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, at 352. “Nothing discourages or prevents [the ICC judges] from looking to 
the growing jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, to state practice, and to 
scholarly texts for guidance on this issue.” Id. 
124 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 25. 
125 Id. at 5. 
126 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 15 (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 211, 
214–18 (2d ed. 2008); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 234-35, 245 (Dec. 10, 1998); 
Brief for International Law Scholars William Aceves et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12–15, 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, et al. v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 09-1262 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2010)). 
127 Goldhaber, supra note 10. 
128 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 17. 
129 Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 875 (2008). 
130 Id. at 873.  
131 Id. at 886. 
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norms with “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations,” these 
violations could be easily recast as common law torts.!#"  
¶56 For example, the attack upon the French diplomat in the "Marbois incident" was a 
battery.!##  Piracy was a trespass to chattels.!#$  As will be analyzed below, it matters not whether 
one looks to domestic civil law or international law to determine the mens rea element; both 
assert the knowledge standard. 
A. U.S. domestic law sets forth the knowledge standard  
¶57 Courts are split in their interpretations of the ATS’s silence on the issue of whether aiding 
and abetting is a mode of establishing a company’s liability under the statute.  Unlike the Ninth 
Circuit in Unocal, which indicates that the ATS allows aiding and abetting claims,!#% other 
federal judges have rejected aiding and abetting claims absent Congressional direction.!#&   
Currently, U.S. courts can choose to apply international law or U.S. federal common law to 
determine third party liability under the ATS.!#'  Although many courts look to international 
customary law to determine liability, domestic tort law is gaining traction as a source of law for 
corporate aiding and abetting standards, as is evident from the D.C. Circuit’s recent analysis in 
Exxon.  This makes sense given the fact that international law does not take a position on civil 
liability with regards to either natural persons or corporations, but leaves that to each nation to 
resolve for itself.!#(  By passing the ATS, Congress resolved that question for the U.S., unlike the 
majority of nations, in favor of civil liability.!#)  As will be analyzed in this section, both a) 
domestic tort law (as exemplified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts ß 876) and b) domestic 
case law (in which judges rely on international jurisprudence) assert that the mens rea standard 
for aiding and abetting liability is knowledge.!$* 
                                                
132 Id.  See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004).  Justice Breyer, in his Sosa concurrence, 
explains in his defense of the Alien Tort Statute that it is acceptable to recognize civil liability where criminal 
liability has been established internationally. Scheffer, Kiobel Amicus, supra note 101, at 7. 
133 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Pa.O. & T. 1784), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17. 
134 Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720; Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. 
Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
135 The Ninth Circuit’s position has subsequently been confirmed. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
257, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (indicating that there is a ‘‘vast body of law finding aiding and abetting liability available 
under the [ATCA].”); Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). GLOBAL LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 133.  
136 GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 133 (citing In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Sprizzo, J.) (drawing a parallel between federal securities litigation and the 
1994 decision Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)); see also 
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 317 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Some analysts argue that “it is 
likely that Congress approves of these claims as demonstrated by the legislative history of the TVPA, which 
anticipates aiding and abetting liability despite the TVPA’s silence on this point.” GLOBAL LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 133. 
137 GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 133. 
138 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 170-72 (Leval, J., concurring). 
139 Id. at 183. 
140 Corporations may also be held liable even under certain U.S. criminal laws.  U.S. courts require a corporate mens 
rea: they look at the employees’ acts and knowledge collectively to determine whether they would constitute a 
criminal offense if such acts had all been committed by one employee. GLOBAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, 
supra note 6, at 80.  Thus, even if one employee did not have sufficient information to possess mens rea for an 
offense, if a number of employees possessed such information collectively, the corporation can be held criminally 
liable. Id. at 80-81. For instance, the D.C. district court found Philip Morris guilty of fraud regarding the health 
effects of smoking; the mens rea was inferred from the collective knowledge of (1) the company’s researchers who 
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¶58 Under U.S. domestic tort law, the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting is knowledge.  
Although the concept of assigning liability to those who enable or encourage tortious conduct 
has existed within common law for centuries, claims specifically concerning aiding and abetting 
have become increasingly common over the last two decades.!$!  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts ß 876 allows for this imposition of liability on persons acting in concert. The Restatement 
attaches liability to an actor who knows that another's conduct constitutes a breach of duty but 
nevertheless provides substantial assistance or encouragement to that party.!$"  The illustration 
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts ß 876 cmt. d, illus. 10 (1976) explains: 
A and B conspire to burglarize C's safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering 
the house and without A's knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the house in 
order to conceal the burglary. A is subject to liability to C, not only for the 
conversion of the contents of the safe, but also for the destruction of the house.!$#  
¶59 In addition to the Restatement, the vast majority of ATS courts that have had occasion to 
determine a mens rea standard for corporate aiding and abetting liability have determined that 
the appropriate standard is knowledge.!$$  This includes the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,!$% 
the Ninth Circuit,!$& and several Second Circuit district courts.!$'  What follows is a brief 
synopsis of their analysis. 
¶60 Doe I v. Unocal!$( is one of the few appellate decisions to discuss aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS.  Although the case was settled and then vacated, Unocal remains an 
important exemplar of the reasoning underlying the liability standard.!$)   
                                                                                                                                                       
knew the harmful effects of smoking and (2) the company’s senior officers who, in making contrary statements, 
recklessly disregarded this knowledge. Id. at 81 (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
896 (D.D.C. 2006)). 
141 Sebok, supra note 129, at 876 (citing Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795) (holding defendant liable for 
aiding and abetting in piracy because he knowingly supplied guns); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. 
Pa. 1793) (court recognized liability for committing aiding or abetting hostilities in violation of the law of nations)). 
142 Sebok, supra note 129, at 876. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979)): “For harm resulting to a 
third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he ... (b) knows that the other's conduct 
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself,” 
cited in John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal. A Paquete Habana Approach to the Rescue, 
32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231, 256 (2004)).  
143 Sebok, supra note 129, at n.44.  
144 Philip A. Scarborough, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
457, 479 (2007) (citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (looking to 
approaches used by ICTR and ICTY, which use similar standard, for assistance in adjudicating "accomplice 
liability" under ATS). 
145 See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303  
(11th Cir. 2008); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); Sinaltrainal v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).  
146 Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63209, at 17-19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,  
2006); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1148–49 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
147 S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 
2d 257, 288-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In 
re Terrorist Attacks on Sept.11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
148 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). 
149 Ryan S. Lincoln, To Proceed with Caution? Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 604, 605 (2010).  
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¶61 The Ninth Circuit considered a summary judgment motion submitted by defendant 
Unocal—a California-based gas company operating in Burma—on claims of aiding and abetting 
under the ATS.!%*  The petitioners, Burmese villagers, alleged that Unocal was an accomplice to 
the Myanmar Military Government’s rape, murder, and torture of villagers within the context of 
forced labor that was used to build a pipeline.!%!  The majority, led by Judge Pregerson, who 
relied heavily on Prosecutor v. Furundzija!%" and Prosecutor v. Musema,!%# found that the source 
of aiding and abetting law for ATS purposes is international law,!%$ and that an actor is liable 
when he provides “knowing practical assistance” to a party who commits a crime in violation of 
international law.!%%  
¶62 The majority held that a reasonable fact finder could determine that Unocal met the mens 
rea standard through actual or constructive knowledge,!%& that forced labor was being used by the 
Myanmar Military to construct a pipeline in the mining areas, and that Unocal gave practical 
assistance by hiring the Myanmar Military to provide security and build infrastructure along the 
pipeline route.!%' Additionally, Unocal had used photos, surveys, and maps in daily meetings 
with the Myanmar Military to show them where the company needed such security and 
infrastructure.!%(  
¶63 Lastly, to determine whether Unocal aided and abetted the Myanmar Military’s acts of 
murder and rape, Judge Pregerson again cited Furundzija to show that even actual or 
constructive knowledge of the specific acts is not necessary; if a defendant knows that “one of a 
number of crimes will probably be committed and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he 
has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime.”!%)  Unocal came close to asserting the 
“Furundzija knowledge standard” for aiding and abetting liability under international law,!&* but 
the parties settled. 
¶64 A New York federal district court also found that knowledge was the standard.  In April 
2009, the Southern District of New York applied the knowledge test in S. African Apartheid 
Litig. v. Daimler AG; Companies operating in South Africa could be held liable for their actions 
if they had knowledge that these actions would substantially assist the commission of offenses by 
the apartheid government.!&!  That knowledge standard, however, was quickly superceded by the 
purpose standard when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in October 2009 followed Judge 
Katzmann’s concurring Khulumani opinion and adopted the purpose standard as the law of the 
Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy.!&" 
¶65 Several other circuits have recognized that knowledge is the mens rea standard.  Judges in 
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic held that the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting was knowledge.!&# 
                                                
150 Id. at 606.  
151 Id. (citing Unocal, 395 F.3d 932). 
152 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998). 
153 Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment (Jan. 27, 2000). 
154 By relying on Furundzija and Musema, Pregerson gave strong deference to the ICTY's and ICTR's analysis of the 
current international aiding and abetting standard. Lincoln, supra note 149, at 606.  
155 Sebok, supra note 129, at 874 (citing Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951).  
156 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 953. 
157 Id. at 952. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 956 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 246 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
160 Haberstroh, supra note 142, at 255.  
161 S. African Apartheid Litig. v. Daimler AG, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
162 582 F.3d 244, 259.  
163 Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
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And in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the Eleventh Circuit found a defendant liable of aiding and 
abetting under the ATS by virtue of “active participation,” defined as substantial assistance given 
to the principal done with knowledge that it would assist the activity at the time the assistance 
was provided.!&$   
¶66 Hence, in Kiobel, as is evident from the Restatement and from relevant domestic case law, 
the Second Circuit needed to find that Shell had knowledge in order to hold it liable for aiding 
and abetting under the ATS.  As was asserted by Leval, the Kiobel Complaint plausibly alleges 
that the appellants knew of human rights abuses committed by officials of the Nigerian 
government and took actions that contributed to the commission of those offenses.!&%   
B. Domestic courts that set forth the purpose standard have misinterpreted customary 
international law  
¶67 The customary international law standard required by Sosa!&& is applicable to future ATS 
cases not only in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, but also in terms of the mens rea 
element.!&'  The customary law standard has long established a knowledge standard for aiding 
and abetting.  As discussed above, federal common law, which is informed by customary 
international law,!&( also sets forth the knowledge standard for accessorial liability under the 
ATS.  As the Second Circuit District Court previously found in In Re South African Apartheid 
Litigation,  
[T]here are no applicable international legal materials requiring a finding of 
specific intent before imposing liability for aiding and abetting a violation of 
customary international law.  As a result, I [Judge Shira Scheindlin] conclude that 
customary international law requires that an aider and abettor know that its 
actions will substantially assist the perpetrator in the commission of a crime or 
tort in violation of the laws of nations.!&) 
¶68 As will be analyzed below, several Second Circuit judges have arrived at the purpose 
standard through a misunderstanding of international customary law. In Khulumani’s three-judge 
panel split, Judge Katzmann determined that the defendant must act with a purpose of bringing 
about the abuses.!'*  Katzmann’s analysis then became law of the circuit in the Talisman 
decision,!'! which then became the case that the Kiobel judges relied upon for their assertion that 
the purpose standard was required for aiding and abetting liability.!'"  The following section 
analyzes what went wrong with this Second Circuit precedent. 
                                                
164 Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d. 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005). 
165 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 188 (Leval, J., concurring). 
166 An international customary norm must be a “norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
167 Scheffer, Talisman Amicus, supra note 95, at 5. 
168 Id. at 6.   
169 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 3, 345-46 (citing S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 262). 
170 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 188 (Leval, J., concurring). 
171 Id. at 193 (Leval, J., concurring). 
172 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 154 (Maj. Op.), 193 (Leval, J., concurring). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 140
1. What went wrong in the Second Circuit: Khulumani and Talisman 
¶69 In Khulumani, three groups of South African plaintiffs brought ATS claims against 
approximately fifty corporate defendants alleging that they had “actively and willingly” 
maintained the apartheid system in collaboration with the South African Government.!'#  The 
Second Circuit held that there was aiding and abetting liability under the ATS, but the three-
judge panel split on the standard for liability.  Judge Katzmann took the position that the 
plaintiffs’ claim for aiding and abetting should adopt the test set out in international law—
specifically the Rome Statute!'$—while Judge Hall found that domestic law applied, specifically 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts ß 876.!'%   
¶70 Under the Restatement, and according to domestic case law,!'& the U.S. mens rea 
requirement for civil aiding and abetting is knowledge.  Had Katzmann interpreted the Rome 
Statute correctly both judges would have arrived at the same knowledge standard.  Instead—and 
despite conceding that the definiteness of the Rome Statute’s definition was ultimately 
uncertain—Katzmann asserted that the Rome Statute sets forth the purpose standard.!'' 
¶71 Judge Korman, who concurred in part and dissented in part, agreed with Katzmann that the 
Rome Statute provides the proper international aiding and abetting standard.!'(  He argued that 
footnote twenty in Sosa required courts to undertake a “norm-by-norm” analysis, to determine 
whether each norm of international law provides for aiding and abetting.!')  
¶72 The Harvard Law Review argues that the Second Circuit made the same mistake in looking 
to footnote twenty of the Sosa opinion in Kiobel: it is a question of substantive international law 
when judges determine whether an international norm applies.!(*  The norm that imposes a duty 
must specify to whom the duty applies.  Aiding and abetting, however, is part of a liability 
theory, the Law Review argues, and is not inherently part of a substantive norm.!(! Authorities 
from the Restatement to the Rome Statute to the rules for U.S. military commissions all define 
liability theories separately from the underlying offenses.!(" Sosa thus does not directly indicate 
whether federal common law or international law determines the standards for aiding and 
abetting.!(#  Thus, neither does it directly establish the appropriate mens rea requirement.!($  
                                                
173 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007).  
174 Id. at 275 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
175 Id. at 284-87 (Hall, J., concurring). 
176 See id. at 287-88 (Hall, J., concurring) (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
177 Michael Garvey, Comment, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Legislative 
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¶73 Under the Sosa standard, courts need not (but may) look to international customary law to 
determine the mens rea standard since customary law defers civil liability to the standards of 
each country.  Should domestic courts look to international customary law, however, they would 
find that, like domestic tort law, it sets forth the knowledge standard. The Second Circuit judges 
created an unnecessary conflict.  If Katzmann had interpreted the Rome Statute correctly, he 
would have found that it is in accordance with domestic tort law.   
¶74 In Talisman, the Second Circuit answered the question of corporate intent by adopting 
Katzmann’s opinion as law of the circuit.  The Second Circuit held that the district court 
correctly dismissed the case because the plaintiffs could not show that Talisman Energy Inc. 
(Talisman), a Canadian energy company, provided substantial assistance to the Government of 
Sudan with the purpose of aiding its unlawful conduct.!(% 
¶75 Talisman held a 25 percent stake in oil development operations of the Greater Nile 
Petroleum Exporting Company (GNPOC), which operated in Sudan. Amidst the Sudanese civil 
war, the GNPOC relied on Sudanese military forces for security while conducting its resource 
development operations.!(& The Sudanese military benefited from GNPOC’s activities, such as 
the airstrips it built for development projects.!(' Plaintiffs argued that Talisman knew that these 
activities furthered Sudanese military actions, and brought suit alleging that Talisman aided and 
abetted the Government of Sudan in committing genocide, torture, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.!(( 
¶76 The court relied on Judge Katzmann's concurrence from Khulumani, passing over Judge 
Hall’s analysis, domestic ATS case law and tort law, and international law sources, all of which 
specify a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting, in favor of the Rome Statute.!() The 
Second Circuit thus held that purpose, rather than knowledge, is the mens rea standard for aiding 
and abetting under the ATS.!)* Applying the purpose standard, the Court found that Talisman’s 
knowledge of the Sudanese Government’s international law violations did not rise to the mens 
rea level necessary to hold the company accountable.!)!  
¶77 Talisman’s purpose standard for corporate aiding and abetting liability introduced a split 
from Unocal's analysis.!)"  When one looks to how other U.S. district courts have ruled on the 
issue, as well as to international sources, it is evident that Talisman, and now Kiobel, are the odd 
ones out.  
¶78 The distinction lies in the weight given to different sources of international law.  Within its 
scope of analysis, each circuit court included decisions by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
and the Rome Statute, yet came down differently on the mens rea standard.  That division in 
analysis is largely due to Judge Katzmann’s misunderstanding of the Rome Statute, which in fact 
does not establish the higher purpose standard for civil aiding and abetting liability in domestic 
courts.   
                                                                                                                                                       
applies a knowledge standard for aiding and abetting”) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724, 732). 
184 Case Comment, supra note 180, at 1958. 
185 Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262. 
186 Id. at 249. 
187 Id. at 249-50.  
188 Id. at 247. 
189 Id. at 259. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 260-61. 
192 Lincoln, supra note 149, at 610. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 142
C. Customary International Law sets forth the knowledge standard 
¶79 The Sosa decision makes it clear that courts must look to the norm of nations.  Customary 
international law is defined by the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law as “law 
[that] results from a general and consistent practice of States followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation.”!)# These standards are derived from international conventions, judicial 
decisions from international tribunals, and general principles of law that are widely recognized 
within developed nations.!)$ Contemporary discussions on aiding and abetting law generally 
focus on interpretations of the decisions rendered by special international tribunals involving 
Germany, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia,!)% where the knowledge standard has been 
applied to individuals prosecuted for aiding and abetting the commission of atrocity crimes.!)&   
¶80 The Nuremberg Military Tribunal (“NMT”), an international court formed after World 
War II to hold accountable violators of international law, recognized aiding and abetting as a 
basis for criminal liability.!)' The London Agreement of August 8, 1945, established this tribunal 
and provided for the culpability of those who did not directly carry out war crimes, but who 
assisted in their commission.!)(  The NMT found that the correct mens rea standard for aiding 
and abetting is knowledge.!))  
¶81 While the generally applied mens rea standard was the knowledge test,"** there was one 
trial in which the NMT required a purpose standard.  After World War II, in United States v. 
Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (The Ministries Case),"*! a German industrialist and chairman of 
the Dresdner Bank, Karl Rasche, was accused of knowingly providing loans to businesses that 
relied on forced labor. Despite evidence showing he was substantially certain his funding would 
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facilitate atrocities, the NMT acquitted the chairman because it was not proved that he had 
purpose."*"  
¶82 This case has been distinguished and dismissed as an outlying case, however.  In other 
NMT trials, judges found defendants culpable for knowingly, not purposefully, contributing to 
the commission of an international crime."*# In United States v. Flick, for example, a German 
industrialist was convicted of international crimes based on his knowledge and approval of 
decisions made by his deputy to use Russian prisoners of war as slave labor."*$ There were no 
facts proving that the deputy had the purpose to enslave the prisoners of war."*% Flick is 
frequently cited for the proposition that knowledge is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting 
liability."*& 
¶83 A British military court, in analyzing In re Tesch (The Zyklon B Case),"*' offered 
additional clarity regarding the mens rea standard it applied.  Here, the defendants sold poison 
gas to the Nazi party knowing that it would be used to commit mass murder, but without specific 
intent to harm those persons."*( Nonetheless, the tribunal found the defendants culpable, 
explicitly holding that knowledge without purposeful intent was sufficient to create culpability in 
that situation."*)   
¶84 United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case) also describes the mental state 
required to convict a third-party for assisting in the commission of a crime."!* The NMT held that 
a Nazi interpreter who turned over lists of Communist party members to his organization, 
knowing that the Nazis would kill those individuals “served as an accessory to the crime.”"!!   
¶85 More contemporary tribunals, such as the ICTR and the ICTY, recognize that the proper 
mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability is knowledge."!" As Katzmann himself points 
out, the ICTY and the ICTR tribunal decisions hold liable individuals who provide assistance 
with “the knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist in the commission of 
the specific crime of the principal.”"!#  The ICTY in Furundzija, for instance, determined that a 
defendant's culpability for aiding and abetting turns on whether “the defendant knew that his or 
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her actions would aid the offense.”"!$ It did not require that an accomplice share a common 
purpose with the actual perpetrators of the crime."!% 
¶86 The NMT, ICTR, and ICTY have all asserted the knowledge standard, and the Rome 
Statute also likely indicates the knowledge standard.  This standard aligns with U.S. tort law 
under the Restatement and relevant case law.  In order to establish aiding and abetting liability 
under the ATS, plaintiffs need show that a corporation has knowledge.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶87 While many experts focus on whether international law or federal common law should 
govern the standards for accessorial civil liability under the ATS, it is the misinterpretation of 
international customary law that is the root of the diverging opinions concerning the mens rea 
standard."!& In fact, international law and domestic law reach the same conclusion, which is that 
the mens rea standard for accessorial civil liability is knowledge.  
¶88 The D.C. Circuit’s recent opinion in Exxon regarding the fact that a) corporations are 
proper defendants under the ATS and b) the appropriate mens rea standard is “knowledge” 
further cements the split with the Second Circuit's mens rea analysis.  Should the Supreme Court 
decide that corporations are proper defendants under the ATS, the next critical issue will be the 
mens rea standard."!'  Federal courts and future litigants should be aware of the shortcomings in 
the Second Circuit’s latest mens rea analysis.  The judges in Talisman, and now Kiobel, rely on 
Judge Katzmann’s erroneous interpretation in Khulumani of the aiding and abetting standards 
under international customary law.  
¶89 By utilizing Katzmann’s concurring opinion, which is primarily based on a faulty analysis 
of the Rome Statute, the judges in Kiobel arrive at the flawed conclusion that the mens rea 
standard for corporate aiding and abetting liability under the ATS is purpose.  Judge Leval 
criticizes the majority for basing its corporate accessorial liability analysis on the Rome Statute, 
which according to Leval should not be used to interpret civil liability or customary international 
law. Ironically, by relying on Katzmann’s mens rea reasoning, Leval ultimately applauded the 
use of the Rome Statute to ascertain aiding and abetting liability.  
¶90 Courts should additionally take note that the U.S. has not ratified the Rome Statute.  In 
fact, one of the very reasons the U.S. opted out of being party to the ICC is due to its divergence 
from customary international law."!(  Furthermore, the Sosa standard does not abandon federal 
common law, which is itself informed by customary international law with respect to accessorial 
liability standards.  Thus, the Supreme Court would likely disprove of a federal court’s heavy 
reliance on the unratified Rome Statute, rather than federal common law, for guidance.   
¶91 On balance, aiding and abetting based on a mens rea standard of knowledge meets with 
such specificity and universal acceptance to be actionable following Sosa."!)  The knowledge 
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standard extends across the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the Rome Statute, and current 
international criminal tribunals.  Should there be any doubt, federal tort law also supports and 
confirms the knowledge standard. 
¶92 The Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision sits at odds with the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in Citizens United v. FEC,""* in which the Supreme Court strengthened corporate rights by 
declaring that corporations are persons when it comes to free speech.  Rather than increase 
responsibility and accountability with the expansion of such rights, the Second Circuit moved to 
decrease corporate liability by holding that corporations may not be sued for human rights abuses 
under the ATS. 
¶93 To address concerns that lowering the mens rea threshold would open up corporations and 
the federal courts to a flood of claims, it should be emphasized that complicity requires a finding 
that the company’s practical assistance or encouragement has a substantial effect on the 
furtherance of human rights abuses. Merely conducting commercial activities in a country that 
commits human rights violations, for instance, would not be sufficient to hold the company 
liable.""!  The “Sosa parameters” also apply; a company may only be liable for conduct that is 
universally accepted as reprehensible."""   
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